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This paper studies whether in Pakistan the dynamic behaviour of unemployment, 
inflation, budget deficit and real GDP growth is systematically affected by the timing of 
elections. We cover the period from 1973-2009. Our results can be summarised as follows: (1) 
Unemployment tends to be lower in pre-election periods and tends to increase immediately 
after elections, perhaps as a result of politically motivated employment schemes. (2) Inflation 
tends to be lower in pre-election periods, perhaps as a result of pre-electoral price regulation. 
(3) We find increase in the governmental budget deficit, financed by heavy government 
borrowings from the central bank and banking sector during election year. (4) Real GDP 
growth and real governmental investment growth declines during pre and post election terms 
possibly as a result of inefficient resource allocation. 
JEL Classification: D72, D78, H50, H61, E51 
Keywords: Opportunistic Political Business Cycle, Fiscal Policy, Macro-
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Political business cycle theory formalises the common perception that politicians 
use expansionary economic policies in a pre-election period to enhance their chances of 
re-election.1 Opportunistic politicians are primarily interested in retaining office. When 
they face an electorate that prefers high growth, low unemployment and low inflation, 
politicians may use expansionary fiscal or monetary policies to create a short term 
economic boom before and during the election campaign. Naive voters are unable to 
understand the politician’s manipulation of the economy and it’s adverse after effects. On 
the contrary, they enjoy the boom and re-elect the politician. 
Rational voters, of course, anticipate manipulating behaviour and may not reward 
politicians. However, theoretical models [Rogoff (1990); Sieg (1997)] including rational 
voters and time inconsistent [Kydland and Prescott (1977)] policies find cycles that are 
similar to the naive cycles postulated by Nordhaus (1975).  In this “rational” line of 
literature, politicians create booms before elections as a signal of competence. Because 
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1Following the seminal papers by Nordhaus (1975, 1989) and MacRae (1977) many authors developed 
a deep understanding in the political business cycle. See Drazen (2000), Gärtner (2000), Alesina, et al. (1992, 
1993), and Paldam (1997) for surveys, and Blomberg and Hess (2004), Caleiro (2009), Saporiti and Streb 
(2008) and Sieg (2006) for current theoretical papers. 
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inexperienced voters  should not be assumed to be highly rational in the game theoretical 
sense of rational expectations, the common view is that political business cycles in the 
Nordhaus (1975) style are more a phenomenon of newly developed than established  
democracies [Brender and Drazen (2005)]. 
In the literature there are numerous multi-country studies analysis on this subject 
[Alesina (1978); Ginsburgh and Michel (1983); Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1992, 
1993); Schuknecht (1996) and Brender and Drazen (2005, 2008)], however, the political 
business cycle (PBCs) is such a phenomenon that may or may not occur in a country. For 
example different governments have different populist reforms package near the election 
terms acknowledging the needs and demands of their people living in these countries. To 
prove the existence and the significance of a PBC for a specific country a single country 
analysis is much worthwhile and without an alternative. Therefore, the present study 
investigates the existence and significance of political business cycles in case of Pakistan 
during the period 1973-2009.  However, following this research strategy we have to pay a 
price as a single-country study of the PBCs often suffer from a small number of elections. 
We discuss the resulting caveats when we present the econometric results. 
In Pakistan, general elections are held every five years to elect members for the 
national and provincial assemblies. In addition to the national and the provincial 
assemblies, Pakistan also has more than five thousand elected local governments. In this 
study, we have focused only on the national assembly and provincial assembly general 
elections that are held in 1973, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2008.2 
We assume that voters in Pakistan have remained naive and inexperienced for the 
entire duration of the period being studied. Why have they not learned to expect PBCs 
and react accordingly? Suzuki (1992) illustrates the mechanism through which transition 
from naive to sophistication may occur with the passage of time. However, he looks only 
on democratic societies where political systems run smoothly. Suzuki (1992) found that 
Japanese voters learned over time and react accordingly, and he did not detect any sign of 
PBCs in the post-sophistication period. In view of this process, Pakistani voters remained 
naive because of unstable democratic and political system. They even did not yet realise 
the fact that price reliefs given on consumer goods in Ramzan (Holy Month) and price 
cuts on electricity and expenditures on various income support programmes are financed 
by bank borrowing. Such type of ad hoc reliefs will return to them in the forms of 
inflation and accumulation of long term debt along with market distortions. 
Another strong assumption of PBCs theory postulates that politicians know when 
it is the election year, however it is not true in case of Pakistan as the elections 1988, 
1990, 1993 and 1997 held unexpectedly, before the completion of the term. Furthermore, 
endogenous timing of election assumption is not justified here as Pakistan’s Constitution 
describes election term is fixed i.e., 5 years by law and no government can call an early 
election to take advantage of their boom period. However, even though the politicians do 
not know the exact date of election, as they approach near to the completion of term i.e., 
five years, they would engage in political manipulation. And if there is a probability that 
 
2The elections in 1988 and 2002 were held on non-party bases, however the mechanism followed and 
the faces shown up are the same as in case of party basis elections, therefore no distinction has been made in 
this regard. The referenda held during 1985 by the military leader General Zia-ul-Haq to legitimise its rule has 
not been included in this analysis. 
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elections could be due in the future, then politicians can react by inducing expansive 
policies. 
A number of studies have analysed politically motivated business cycles for 
both developed and developing countries. Generally, the empirical political business 
cycle literature can be divided into three main categories. The first category attempts 
to locate political cycles in macroeconomic outcomes. These models have focused, 
almost exclusively, on four macroeconomic indicators: growth, inflation, 
unemployment and income. The observed empirical evidences in this case are not 
very much supportive for the PBCs as uncovered by McCallum (1978), Paldam 
(1979), Golden and Porterba (1980), Beck (1982), Alt (1985), and Hibbs (1977). 
However, Nordhaus (1989), Haynes and Stone (1989, 1990), Krause (2005) and 
Grier (2008) confirm the PBCs existence in macro outcomes, whereas Alesina and 
co-authors [Alesina (1987, 1989); Alesina and Rosenthal (1989); Alesina and 
Roubini (1992) and Alesina, et al. (1992, 1997)] associated it with the Partisan 
Effects. The reasoning behind this is that in the short run policy results on growth 
and unemployment may not be obvious enough to voters, so governments may try to 
stimulate those policy variables that have direct monetary benefits to voters like 
government transfers, tax cuts, subsidies, special employment schemes etc. [Hibbs 
(2000) and Batool and Sieg (2009)].  
The second major category of Political Business Cycle research concentrates on 
the policy instruments instead of macroeconomic outcomes. The evidence for this type of 
a political business cycle is generally stronger than that for macroeconomic outcomes. 
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1992), have investigated the 18 OECD countries and found 
a very little evidence of pre-electoral effects of economic outcomes, in particular, on 
GDP growth and unemployment; although they observed some evidence of “political 
monetary cycles” and political budget cycles prior to the election and in election years.  
Inflation also exhibits a post-electoral jump, which they explained by either the pre-
electoral “loose” monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of 
increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes. Similarly, Andrikopoulos, et al. 
(2004) found an increase in the budget deficits during the election year in the European 
Union countries; furthermore they found a significant but small partisan effect on fiscal 
policy outcomes. Brender and Drazen (2005, 2008) investigated a large panel of countries 
and traced the fact that political budgets cycles are more likely to occur in the newly 
established democracies than established democracies as the voters from developed 
democracies may be well informed about fiscal outcomes. Gonzalez (2002) and Shi and 
Svennsson (2002) has discussed these outcomes as an effect of transparency. The high 
would be the degree of transparency; the less likely would be the political cycles in 
aggregate expenditure or in deficit to appear. However absence of political cycles in 
budget aggregates in established democracies does not, however, mean that there are no 
electoral effects on fiscal policy. Established democracies appear to be characterised by 
cycles in the composition of spending rather than cycles in its overall level. This 
argument is empirically observed in United States [Peltzman (1992)], Canada [Kneebone 
and McKenzie (2001)], Colombia [Drazen and Eslava (2005)], Israel [Brender (2003)] 
and in India [Khemani (2004)]. 
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The third major category of research focuses on a unique policy instrument i.e. 
monetary policy (also known as the political monetary cycle). A number of empirical 
studies are found on central bank monetary policy and political business cycles. Sieg 
(2006) found that both left wing and right wing governments with partisan preferences 
use opportunistic policies through an expansion in the money supply. Such an 
expansionary policy would help in stimulating the economy by generating employment 
opportunities and induce inflation. The existence of monetary political cycle has been 
uncovered in Abrams and Iossifov (2006) for US and in Ferris (2008) for Canada, if and 
only if there found to be some party affiliations between government and the central bank 
decision maker. However, such empirical evidence has not been found in case of 
European countries. In the European Union (EU), politicians are not empowered to use 
monetary policy instruments, because this policy is delegated to the independent 
European Central Bank.  In line with this scenario, PBCs hypothesis has been rejected by 
Berger and Woitek (1997) for Germany and by Leertouwer and Maier (2001) for 14 
OECD countries. In contrast, Taekoi (2009) studied the existence of opportunistic cycles 
in Brazilian economy subject to country’s exchange rate regime and central bank 
independence. He found the existence of electorally induced fiscal cycles under fixed and 
crawling peg exchange rate regimes and electorally induced monetary cycles under 
floating exchange rates in Brazil only when the nation’s central bank is not independent.  
To sum it up, political monetary cycles can be utilised by the opportunistic politicians in 
both cases either central bank share some party affiliations or remain less independent in 
terms of its monetary operations.  To cover all three categories, this study focuses on 
growth, unemployment, inflation and some fiscal and monetary policy indicators. 
Despite plenty of empirical evidence found on political business cycles for both 
developed and developing countries, this area of research remains untouched in case of 
Pakistan. The present study fills the gap. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
discusses the model specification and the research methodology.  Section 3 provides 
empirical evidence using annual data from 1973 to 2009 for various macroeconomic 
variables. Section 4 gives a summary of our findings and a conclusion. 
 
2.  MODEL AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Turning to the empirical literature, politico-economic models have been tested 
with a time-series approach. The usual research strategy is to isolate a key 
macroeconomic variable and ascertain whether or not in election and pre-election years 
this variable behaves differently than in non-election years. The earlier procedures 
entailed simple comparisons of the average value of the actual unemployment and 
inflation rates in election and non-election years, or according to the party in power. 
Generalising this approach, Mc-Callum (1978) and most of those who followed estimated 
uni-variate time series models and tested for shifts in the intercept parameter [Pack 
(1987) and Keil (1988)]. According to this procedure the impact of the political sector is 
viewed as an exogenous intervention in the economic process, producing a cyclical 
(Political Business Cycle) or temporary shift in the mean value of the time series. 
Accordingly, the test is for the significance of an appropriately defined dummy variable, 
the intervention variable that is added to a uni-variate ARMA (ARIMA) representation of 
the series. 
 Pakistan, Politics and Political Business Cycles  157 
1 1
n m
t p t q t i t
p q
X c X p q D
= =
= + θ − + φ δ − + + δ∑ ∑ ∑  … … … (1) 
To illustrate, let Xt be a variable of interest and assume that  Xt can only be positive 
and follows a stationary first-order autoregressive moving average process. Where 
, …… are the parameters of autoregressive terms of the model, while , ……	are 
the parameters of moving average terms of the model, 	 is a constant, and 
 is the error 
term assumed to be independent identically-distributed random variables (i.i.d.) sampled 
from a normal distribution with zero mean: 
~(0, ) where  is the variance. We 
begin with the construction of a benchmark Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) 
for unemployment and inflation i.e., Phillips curve hypothesis and Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models for other fiscal and monetary policy 
indicators, as the fiscal and monetary variables including GDP are integrated of order 
one. To test the impact of politics on macroeconomic variables we have defined the 

























 and	 are the pre-election dummies, and  is the post election dummy 
variable.		is defined in a way that can capture the  pre-election year and election year 
effect, because it may happen that politically motivated  policies take start one year ahead, or 
it may happen that they take place only during the election year. Therefore, we defined two 
pre-election windows and tested each one by one, and reported which one is valid in that 
particular case. The positive and negative signs of these dummy variables will determine the 
positive and negative impact of elections on macroeconomic outcomes and aggregate demand 
driven by monetary and fiscal policy instruments. For example, if a government tries to 
increase growth and employment before an election and uses expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies, then or  or both should be positive in the estimated equations of 
growth, budget deficit, monetary aggregates and government’s budgetary borrowing. If the 
government adopts a contractionary policy shift in the post election year, then these 
instruments show the downward trend that can be measured by a negative sign of . It 
should however be noted that in case of inflation and unemployment, pre-electoral variables 
should denote decrease and should have negative signs, while the post-election variables 
should have a positive sign to reflect the impact of pre-election expansionary policies. 
Quarterly or high frequency data is recommended to investigate the issue of 
political business cycle. But in the case of Pakistan the national income accounts and 
unemployment data is available only in annual frequency.3 Therefore, we have used the 
 
3Although high frequency data on financial sector such as exchange rate and stock market prices are available; 
however in this study we have constrained the analysis to the national income accounts and unemployment data.    
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annual time series data from 1973-20094 for the proposed variables. The underlying study 
period covers seven elections: 1977, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2008. The 
election dates and corresponding fiscal years are shown in Table 5 in the Appendix. 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
First we test predictions of the classic opportunistic political cycle model by 
Nordhaus (1975). The model predicts political manipulation in unemployment and 
inflation. Analogical political behaviour implies cycles in macroeconomic variables such 
as growth, money supply, fiscal deficit, and budgetary borrowing etc. 
 
3.1. Unemployment, Inflation and Opportunistic Business Cycle 
Estimated ARMA model results for unemployment (see Table 1) show that  is 
significant and has a negative sign. During the election year and one year prior to the 
election year the unemployment rate was reduced by 19 percent in comparison to other 
years. The political dummy variable  for the post-election year is positive but not 
statistically significant.  
This result may attribute to the switch from expansionary to contractionary policy 
when an incumbent party wins the election and cancellation of old employment 
generation schemes if the opposition is elected into office. Both results fully support the 
political business cycle theories. 
 
Table 1 
Unemployment, Inflation and Political Business Cycles 
Variables Unemployment	() Inflation (Δ) 
Constant 1.1133*** 0.0864*** 0.0769*** 
Deterministic Trend 0.0265***   
AR(1) 0.9522*** 0.6029*** 0.4767*** 
AR(2) –0.3255*   
MA(5)  –0.8984*** –0.8885*** 
MA(7) –0.9027***   
  –0.0228***  
 –0.1911***   
 0.0207 0.0033 0.0157** 
 35 35 35 
 0.95 0.74 0.66 
D.W stat 1.97 1.88 1.97 
S.EE 0.10 0.102 0.026 
***, ** and * denote rejection of null hypothesis at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance 
respectively. Unemployment rate has been taken in logarithmic form. 
 
4Before 1971, the present Bangladesh was part of Pakistan called West Pakistan. Therefore, we have 
excluded the earlier time period from the analysis. 
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Inflation is another important key to understand the political business cycles. 
Election periods cause great sensitivity on the side of the government to keep quiet about 
increases of regulated prices by deferring them to the post-election period. Thus after 
each election it is common to hear oppositional parties accusing the returned party for 
exploiting the myopic expectations of voters to boost their probability of winning the 
election. However, if the incumbent party looses the election despite deferring price 
increases, then the winning party would again accuse the former incumbent party for 
leaving a huge economic burden by not increasing the regulated prices. This has to be 
fulfilled by the new government who would immediately receive a negative point in its 
honeymoon period. 
Estimated ARIMA model for inflation (see Table1) shows with a negative 
sign that means during the pre-election year the inflation has been kept lower by 2.2 
percentage points in comparison to other years. Non-realised price increases in 
regulated sectors are subsidised by the government through debt financing. 
Consequently, the budget deficit rises and creates an inflationary pressure and debt 
sustainability problem in the post-election period. The post-election year dummy 
variable found to be insignificant, however if we estimate the ARIMA model and 
incorporate only the post-election year dummy and ignore the pre-election effect  
then the post-election dummy is found to be statistically significant (see Table 1, 
column 4). 
Both unemployment and inflation results are consistent with the pre-election 
political manipulation as the politicians try to maximise their chance of re-election by 
increasing the employment conditions and controlling the inflation artificially during the 
election and prior to the election period. But the post-election year dummy variables are 
found to be statistically insignificant but have correct signs, employing that post-election 
effect is less pronounced. The evidence supports the argument by Ginsburgh and Michel 
(1983), pointing the fact that if there is government fall and resultant early election as in 
case of Pakistan in 1990, 1993 and 1997 before the legal term, the political business 
cycles would be less pronounced. 
The GDP growth estimated ARIMA model (see Table 2) does not provide 
any supporting evidence for the Nordhaus (1975) opportunistic business cycle 
theory as political variable  and  both estimated to be negative i.e., have the 
wrong sign. Miss-allocation of resources during and after the election period could 
be the reason. Although the results seem to be fine to some extent, there is concern 
regarding the stationarity assumption of the variable series raised by Enders 
(2004). 
The basic underlying assumption of the ARMA model is the stationarity of the 
variable over time. The simple ADF/DF test shows that inflation and GDP growth are 
stationary at level, while the unemployment is found to be integrated of order one 
which makes the unemployment ARMA model results suspicious. Therefore, the 
discussion remains inconclusive and there is a need for further exploration of the 
phenomena. 
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Table 2 
Fiscal and Monetary Variables and Opportunistic Business Cycle 
Variables Δ Δ  ! 
Constant 0.0619*** 0.0919*** 1.6219*** 
AR(1)   –0.7198** 
MA(2) 0.2968***   
MA(4) 0.1919**   
MA(5) –0.8061*** –0.9544***  
MA(6)   –0.8820*** 
MA(9)  –0.857***  
  –0.1434*** 0.1423*** 
 –0.014***   
 –0.032*** –0.1351*** 0.0157** 
 36 36 36 
 0.50 0.68 0.65 
D.W stat 2.05 1.61 2.22 
S.EE 0.015 0.07 0.17 
***, ** and * denote rejection of null hypothesis at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance 
respectively. 
 
3.2.  Fiscal and Monetary Variables and Opportunistic Business Cycle 
The original opportunistic business cycle model by Nordhaus (1975) focuses on 
political cycles in inflation, employment and growth which are induced by monetary 
policy. However, Rogoff’s (1990) model is grounded in the use of fiscal policy tools. 
More recent, Drazen (2000) has argued that PBC models based on monetary surprises are 
unconvincing, among other reasons, because of their implicit assumption that the 
incumbent party directly controls the monetary policy.5  Instead Drazen (2000) builds on 
Rogoff (1990) to derive a model in which PBC arises from active fiscal policy 
interventions that are later accommodated by the monetary expansions. Various empirical 
studies being in line with that approach have been carried out on monetary and fiscal 
budget political cycles [Brender and Drazen (2008)]. Following Schuknecht (1996) we 
concentrate on fiscal deficit, government investment, monetary aggregate ("2) and 
government budgetary borrowing. We first apply the unit root test. The ADF results show 
that all variables are integrated of order one that requires 1st difference for the series to 
be stationary (see Table 4). In a second step we have estimated the parsimonious ARIMA 
model for these fiscal and monetary variables. The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
The ARIMA model result for real government investment states that  and  
are both negative which implies that government investment has declined by 14 (13) 
percent during the election (post-election) year. 
 
5
 See, however, Sieg (1997), for monetary cycles even if central banks are independent. 
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Table 3 
Fiscal and Monetary Variables and Opportunistic Business Cycles 
Variables Δ$!! Δ$!!  Δ"2 
Constant 0.1060*** 0.1085*** 0.1339*** 
AR(5)  –0.5937***  
AR(10) –0.4828*** –0.8654***  
MA(1) 0.3088**   
MA(3) 0.3077** 0.8353***  
MA(4) 0.8605***   
MA(5)   –0.987***  
 0.1196*** 0.1381*** 0.0481*** 
  –0.077*** –0.0233** 
 26 26 35 
 0.62 0.59 0.59 
D.W stat 2.23 1.85 2.05 
S.EE 0.08 0.08 0.03 
***, ** and * denote rejection of null hypothesis at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance 
respectively. 
 
In contrast, the pre-electoral variable  is positive in the budget deficit as percentage 
of GDP equation, which can quantify a 14 percent increase in the budget deficit during the 
election year. This may be attributed to the fact that during the election campaign the 
government uses expansionary policies and spends more on current expenditures like tax cuts, 
subsidies, price supports and election campaigns etc. and not for investment purposes. For 
example despite the global oil price inflation during 2005-2008, Pakistan government heavily 
subsidies the energy sector i.e., petrol prices to control the inflation artificially in the pre-
election period of election 2008. Consequently the development expenditures are 
approximately 4.4 percent of GDP (5 percent in 2007) while current expenditures are about 18 
(15.8 percent in year 2007) percent of GDP in year 2008.6  These current expenditures help 
the government to realise their short term objective i.e., collect votes, but do not have any 
significant impact on macroeconomic growth. Such fiscal deficits are financed by internal or 
external sources especially accommodated by the countries banks and create additional impact 
on monetary policy variables. In this regard we have expanded our analytical framework to 
the monetary sector by including	"2, net government budgetary borrowing and budgetary 
borrowing from the banking sector.  
The ARIMA model results show that  has the expected signs, in case of net 
government budgetary borrowing and borrowing from the banking sector, showing 11 
and 13 percent increase during the election years (see Tables 2 and 3). Both effects 
demonstrate clear patterns of opportunistic politically motivated fiscal expansion 
accommodated by the monetary sector. This type of government borrowing can cause a 
sudden rise in money supply and induce inflationary pressures in the economy. 
Post-election effect i.e., 	 turned out to be insignificant, implies that in the post 
election period there is no significant contraction in the government borrowing to offset 
the pre-election manipulation. Estimated ARIMA model results for "2 confirm this 
 
6However, econometric results are unable to detect any statistical significant results regarding the 
composition changes in the total expenditures during the election timings.  
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monetary expansion as it registered a 4 percent rise during the same period, however this 
is less than the rise in the budgetary borrowing.7 During the post-election year, "2 
growth registered a contraction by approximately the same percentage (2 percent), 
consistent to (7 percent) decline in the budgetary borrowing from the banking sector, 
representing a tight monetary stance taken to curtail the inflation in the post-election year. 
 
4.  SUMMARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
Inexperienced voters are a well known breeding ground for opportunistic political 
business cycles. In this study we prove that Pakistani society suffers from politically 
motivated inefficient economic policies. We have used annual data for unemployment, 
inflation, growth and other macroeconomic indicators for the period 1973-2009. The paper 
has used simple intervention analysis in time series data to examine the fluctuations during the 
election and non-election years. Results show that unemployment rate has been significantly 
reduced during the election and one year before the election year. Inflation shows similar 
patterns as during the election period it is kept down by 2.2 percent. The reason could be that 
the ruling party keeps the regulated prices artificially low before election and delays the cost 
push inflation by the post-election period. This is consistent with the recent surge in energy 
prices in Pakistan, where just after the election of 2008, the government cut all subsidies and 
raised energy prices which were deliberately kept low up to the end of the election. However, 
the post-election manipulation is absent or we can say less pronounced in both unemployment 
and inflation case. On the fiscal side, we see election year increases in the budget deficit 
accommodated by net government budgetary borrowings, and borrowing from the banking 
sector resulting in monetary expansion and inflationary pressure on the economy. 
Overall, our results coincide with the results Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1992) 
found for 18 OECD countries. To summarise, our findings of substantial electorally 
motivated policy distortions without associated impacts on real GDP and investment 
suggest that Pakistan’s society pays the cost of political business cycles in terms of 
inefficient allocation of resources and market distortions. However, the incumbents are 
unable to realise the potential benefit in terms of re-election, as every time the opposition 
party takes the turn. 
The policy implication derived from the results is that the State Bank (central 
bank) of Pakistan needs to be institutionally strong enough to face the political pressures. 
Although, during 1990 decade, various reforms were introduced to strengthen and 
empower the State Bank of Pakistan in its monetary operations, however SBP is still 
unable to defend its policies against the political pressures. Another solution is 
establishment and strict compliance of fiscal rules that means to dampen the political 
cycles. In this regard, there is an on-going debate among the policy-makers with 
relevance to the amendments and implementation of Fiscal Responsibilities and Debt 
Law Act 2005. The central bank authorities have proposed some changes regarding the 
automatic monetisation of fiscal deficit. There is no prescribed limit on government 
borrowing from the State Bank of Pakistan defined in the SBP Act and in the Fiscal 
 
7This may be due to the fact that Pakistan’s current "2 definition has two main components, Net 
Domestic Assets (NDA) and Net Foreign Assets (NFA). Therefore, it might be possible that the budgetary 
borrowing rise is offset by the contraction in the other component such as NFA, and not exactly depicted in the 
M2 expansion. 
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Responsibility and Debt Limitation (FRDL) Act 2005,8 therefore this unrestricted access 
to central bank borrowing provides a room for the political authorities to use it for own 
interests. In short, the lesson drawn from this research study is that there is a need to 
develop and set-up a knowledge-based economy, proper accountability system, strong 






 Data Variables and Sources 
Name Description Unit Sources 
 log(Unemployment Rate) in percentage Labor Force Survey 
 log(consumer price index) Base at 1999-00 State Bank of Pakistan 
 log(Real GDP) Base at 1999-00 prices State Bank of Pakistan 
 log(Real Government Investment) Base at1999-00 State Bank of Pakistan 
$!! log(Net Government Budgetary Borrowing) PKR in Millions State Bank of Pakistan 
$!!  log(Government Budgetary Borrowing from the 
Banking Sector) 
PKR in Millions State Bank of Pakistan 
"2 log(Broad Money Supply) PKR in Millions State Bank of Pakistan 
 ! log(Fiscal Deficit as  percentage of GDP) PKR in Millions State Bank of Pakistan 
 
Table 5 
 Unit Root Test Results 
Variable Series DF/ADF Test Value lag Deterministic Decision 
 –1.917812 0 c I(1) 
∆ –3.606487** 0 c Stationary 
∆ –3.942443*** 0 c Stationary 
∆ –4.520618*** 1 c Stationary 
∆$!! –3.640938*** 0 c Stationary 
∆$!!  –5.019487*** 0 c Stationary 
∆"2 –3.456143** 5 c Stationary 




Election Date Corresponding Fiscal Year 
General Elections 1977 January 7, March 7 and 10, 1977 1976-77 
Legislative Elections 1988 November 16, 1988 1987-88 
General Elections 1990 October 29, 1990 1989-90 
General Elections 1993 October 6, 1993 1992-93 
General Elections 1997 February 3, 1997 1996-1997 
General Elections 2002 October 10, 2002 2001-2002 
General Elections 2008 February 18, 2008 2007-2008 
 
8Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005 states following principles: (a) reducing the 
revenue deficit to nil not later than the thirtieth  June, 2008, and thereafter  maintaining a revenue surplus; (b) 
ensuring that within a period of ten financial years, beginning from  the first July, 2003 and  ending on  the 
thirtieth June, 2013, the total  public debt at the end of the tenth financial year does not exceed sixty percent of 
the estimated gross domestic product for that year  and thereafter maintaining the total public debt below sixty 
percent of gross domestic product for any given year;  (c) ensuring that in every financial year, beginning from 
the first July, 2003, and ending on the thirtieth June, 2013 the total public debt is reduced by not less than two  
and a half percent of the estimated gross domestic  product for any given year. 
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